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This research paper applies the synthetic control method to measure the economic cost of 
sanctions imposed on South Africa between 1985 and 1994. The economic sanctions imposed 
on South Africa between 1985 and 1994 by the United Nations, the United States of America, 
and the European Community negatively affected the economy. This negative effect on the 
economy, measured by the gross domestic product per capita, continued until 1998 despite the 
sanctions having ended four years earlier. Using the synthetic control method, this research 
paper measures the economic cost by estimating the difference in the gross domestic product 
per capita between the treated country (South Africa) and the counterfactual (synthetic South 
Africa). Synthetic South Africa represents South Africa without undergoing treatment 
(sanctions). What would have happened if sanctions were not imposed? The results indicate 
that the economic cost is most pronounced after the sanctions ended, indicating a substantial 
lag effect. South Africa’s gross domestic product per capita is 30% lower than synthetic South 
Africa by 1998. This potentially indicates that the sanctions had a long-lasting effect. The 
results are not sensitive to the composition of the donor pool. Furthermore, the placebo tests 
reveal that the results are statistically significant at the 10% threshold with only one country 
(Philippines) having a treatment effect that is larger than South Africa’s and a better fit.  For 
target nations, it means that policy makers should acknowledge that a policy that leads to 
sanctions may have a severe and long-lasting impact on the economy. Potential areas for future 
investigation include estimating the humanitarian effect of the sanctions imposed on South 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background and Context of the Research Paper 
Starting in the 1960s, South Africa (SA) increasingly became a pariah in the international 
community because of its racial discrimination policies, political marginalisation, human rights 
abuses, and international aggression (Crawford & Klotz, 1999) (Evenett, 2002). Several actors 
in the international community started to impose sanctions, implementing a diverse range of 
voluntary and mandatory restrictions on relations with SA (Crawford & Klotz, 1999). 
According to Crawford and Klotz (1999) and Evenett (2002), anti-apartheid activism began in 
the 1960s and peaked in 1985 in response to the state of emergency. Apartheid was a system 
of racial oppression that was legalised in 1948. Legally, all races were treated unequal, had 
different economic opportunities (that favoured white people), and had to live separately. In 
1985, the United Nations (UN) imposed voluntary comprehensive economic sanctions on SA 
that restricted new investment and trade. The UN encouraged member countries to supplement 
the voluntary sanctions. The United States (US) Congress imposed sanctions on SA in 1986 to 
encourage the government to end its policy of apartheid (Friedman, 1991, p. 2). It banned all 
trade with South Africa and prohibited US banks from lending money to the SA government 
or making new investments. The European Commission (EC) and Nordic Council also piled 
on more economic sanctions on SA during that period. 
The US put in place five conditions that needed to be met before these sanctions were lifted: 
“1) lifting the state of emergency, 2) legalise democratic parties, 3) repealing the Group Areas 
Act, 4) repealing the Population Registration Act, and 5) release of political prisoners” 
(Friedman, 1991). The US sanctions were lifted in 1991, after the US President declared that 
these conditions were met (Friedman, 1991, p. 3). Other sanctions, however, remained in place, 
such as limited lending from the International Monetary Fund or the Export-Import Bank 
(Friedman, 1991). The UN sanctions were lifted in 1994, the same year that SA had its first 
democratic election. 
Sanctions were widely used since the end of World War I as a tool to influence foreign 
governments. There has been insightful research such as Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot (1990), 
Kaempfer and Loewenberg (2007), and Neuenkirch and Neumeier (2014) about the 




in the approach and metrics employed to measure effectiveness, the factors that contribute to 
this effectiveness and the policy implications of those findings. Research on the economic costs 
is limited and tends to apply traditional econometric techniques (e.g., regressions) or case 
studies. 
This paper further contributes to the sanctions research by analysing the economic cost of the 
sanctions against SA in the period 1985–1994, using the synthetic control method (SCM). It 
leverages the work done by Gharehgozli (2017) when evaluating the impact of sanctions on 
Iran from 2011 to 2014. 
1.2 Statement of Research Problem and Questions 
The impact of economic sanctions from 1985 to 1994 on South Africa has not been evaluated 
using modern econometric techniques. The extent to which this impact has affected the 
economy is contestable in terms of the different econometric techniques used and other 
assumptions that have been made. This research paper focuses on the impact of the economic 
sanctions imposed from 1985 to 1994 on SA. This research paper will measure the impact of 
sanctions on SA’s economy by looking at trends in the gross domestic product (GDP) per 
capita. The rationale behind this research paper is to evaluate the impact,  if any, of the 
economic sanctions of the UN, US, EC and others on SA’s economy. The economic impact 
will be assessed using the SCM. 
1.3 Research Questions and Objectives 
What are the economic costs that SA suffered due to the economic sanctions imposed on it 
between 1985 and 1994? The hypotheses to be evaluated in this research paper address the 
research question in the previous section. The hypotheses are: 
• H1: Economic sanctions had a large negative impact on SA’s GDP per capita between 
1985 and 1994 




1.4 Significance of the Research 
The rationale behind this research paper is to evaluate the financial cost of economic sanctions 
using the latest research techniques (SCM). It also intends to determine if the effects have had 
a long-lasting impact on the economy. A significant gap in the analysis is that none of the 
existing literature estimates the economic cost of sanctions by comparing the growth path 
(GDP per capita) after the imposition of sanctions versus had sanctions not been imposed for 
SA. Those that evaluate the cost of economic sanctions focus on the period during which they 
were implemented instead of considering the longer-term effects. The effectiveness and 
efficiency of the sanctions against SA from the mid-1980s is contentious. This research paper 
aims to contribute to this debate by establishing the economic cost using the SCM. 
1.5 Limitations of the Research Paper 
This research paper focuses purely on the cost of economic sanctions imposed on SA in the 
1980s. The question of the appropriateness and efficiency of economic sanctions is not 
addressed. This paper does not hold a position on which types of sanctions are justified. Unlike 
many studies that analysed the sanctions on SA, this paper does not set out to evaluate the role 
sanctions played in SA’s transition to democracy (Crawford & Klotz, 1999). Other aspects and 
impacts of the US Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act such as the US relations with the ANC 
and imposition of labour practices for US nations are not considered (Redden, 1988). 
1.6 Organisation of the Research Paper 
The next section will be a literature review followed by a discussion on the methodology and 
an analysis of the results of the analysis. The literature review will discuss the existing theories 
about the impact of sanctions, elaborate on the economic cost of sanctions, expand further on 
SA’s experience with sanctions, and consider the appropriateness of various methodologies. 
The methodology section evaluates the SCM versus other alternative methods and explains 
how the methodology will be applied to the research problem. A discussion of the results 
illustrates the key output through charts or tables and discusses the relevant trends. Lastly, the 
conclusion discusses the main insights of the research paper and highlights some areas for 




1.7 Overview of Economic Sanctions 
This section provides an overview of economic sanctions. Since the end of World War I, 
sanctions were used to replace and or supplement war (Malloy, Carter, Wing , & Oliver, 1990). 
Sanctions are an alternative to war and supplement other diplomatic efforts (Hotton, 2016). 
Baldwin (1999) notes that while military force is hardly ever employed without diplomacy or 
economic sanctions, suggesting that diplomacy and economic sanctions are relevant to all 
issues where war is considered appropriate, the reverse does not hold (Baldwin, 1999). 
Sanctions are imposed when the domestic pressure for the local government to act against the 
foreign government to encourage it to change its policy, but diplomacy or propaganda would 
not be adequate responses and military action would be too severe (United States General 
Accounting Office, 1992). Sanctions are measures taken by countries (senders) against other 
countries (targets) (Frank, 2006). But sanctions can also be undertaken by international 
organisation, companies, universities, and individuals (Crawford & Klotz, 1999). 
According to Frank (2006), sanctions can be unilateral or multilateral, comprehensive (total 
economic embargoes) or selective, military (use of armed force, arms embargoes, and 
termination of military assistance), and economic or non-economic (restrictions to participate 
in cultural and sporting events) (Illieva, Aleksandar , & Kokotovic, 2018). These sanctions can 
be targeted at an entire country, including all corporations and individuals or restricted to 
specific individuals. 
This paper focuses on economic sanctions imposed by other countries. Crawford and Klotz 
(1999) define economic sanctions as “the denial of customary interaction of financial resources 
or products to the target, boycotts of the target state’s products, seizures of financial or real-
estate assets held outside the target’s borders, and isolation of the target in material economic 
terms” (Crawford & Klotz, 1999, p. 5). While Hotton (2016) defines them as “manipulation of 
taxation, imports, exports, foreign aid, access to markets or to financial institutions”. Both these 
definitions indicate that the economy of the target will be negatively affected by the actions of 
the sender nation. 
Economic sanctions can adversely affect the target state by decreasing the volume exports and 
imports, causing high inflation, decreasing investment flows coming into the country, 




(Neuenkirch & Neumeier, 2014). Trade sanctions restrict the import and exports to and from 
the target country while financial sanctions restrict the flow of money (Mossuyt, 2018). The 
extent of these effects, however, depends on the target government’s economy, the role of 
third-party states, and the impact of the sanctions on the sender nation. The impact of sanctions 
on the target economy will be discussed in more detail in the literature review section on the 
cost of economic sanctions. 
1.7.1 Who Can Impose Sanctions? 
The target nation can impose sanctions against a sender using several mechanisms. Sanctions 
can be imposed by government, the head of state, legislative organs or state institutions that 
oversee issues related to international diplomacy, and heads of international organisations 
(Afesorgbor, 2019). Each of these depends on the internal regulations within the sender nation. 
Given the UN, EC, and US regularly use sanctions as punitive measures against target nations, 
this section will elaborate on the different mechanisms they apply to impose sanctions. 
The UN implements comprehensive sanctions through the Security Council. The Security 
Council can only employ enforcement measures when there is an international breach or threat 
of peace and or an act of aggression (Hotton, 2016). The UN employed the first sanctions in 
1966 against Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). The individual geopolitical interests of each Security 
Council member trumped the global threat at hand. The UN-led compulsory sanctions, 
therefore, are rarely imposed but there were quite a few voluntary ones (which are ineffective). 
The EC implements sanctions regimes decided by the UN Security Council (UNSC) but also 
implements its own sanctions without a UNSC mandate (Portela, 2014). Furthermore, the EC 
often supplements the UNSC sanctions with more stringent measures (Portela, 2014). The EC 
prefers to use targeted sanctions such as arms embargoes and bans on trade in specific goods 
(Illieva, Aleksandar & Kokotovic, 2018). Other measures used by the EC include financial, 
travel, and diplomatic sanctions (Illieva et al., 2018). 
Unilateral sanctions are imposed by a single country. These types of sanctions were criticised 
as contradicting international law because they violate the principle of sovereignty (Burgdorf, 
2009). The US regularly deployed using sanctions both as unilateral sanctions or part of 
multilateral sanctions (Illieva et al., 2018). In some countries, like the US, the President has 




without Congress' approval” (Malloy et al., 1990, p. 203). In the case of a national emergency, 
the President can use a wide range of commercial and financial coercive measures to preserve 
national security (Illieva et al., 2018). It, therefore, is effectively easy for a country to impose 
sanctions on another despite it being contrary to the UN Charter (Illieva et al., 2018). According 
to Illieva et al. (2018), UN members should not be entitled to impose economic sanctions upon 
another member or any Sovereign State. Currently, however, there is no universally accepted 
approach in international law to determine if sanctions are lawful or not (Illieva et al., 2018). 
1.7.2 What is the Purpose of Sanctions? 
The purpose of imposing sanctions differs and is often disputed. Hufbauer et al. (1985) indicate 
that the purpose of sanctions is to precipitate policy change, destabilise the government, and or 
impair the military. Doxey (1998) eloquently said that “motivations for sanctions can be 
punitive, coercive and expressive” (Doxey, 1988, p. 213). Frank (2006) elaborates further by 
stating that the objectives for which sanctions could be applied include national security, 
foreign policy, international trade, and investment dispute resolution. National security 
objectives, according to Frank (2006), are aimed at deterring aggression, curbing weapons 
proliferation, and punishing a country that is sponsoring terrorism. Human rights and the 
promotion of democracy are also common examples of policy changes mentioned by Hufbauer 
et al. (1985) and Frank (2006). A country will impose sanctions for several reasons, for 
example, the objective for the US’s sanctions against North Korea, included improving the 
human rights situation, maintaining peace on the peninsula, preventing nuclear proliferation, 
and promoting peace in the region (Frank, 2006). All these papers indicate that senders use 
sanctions to protect themselves against an inherent threat or encourage another country to act 
as per its preferences. 
When it comes to the real motivation behind the imposition of sanctions, it is often more than 
what meets the eye or is said publicly. According to Hefti and Staehelin-Witt (2000), Frank 
(2006) and Kaempfer and Loewenberg (2007), the purpose of sanctions is more about 
appeasing and pacifying the local population than it is about achieving the real impact. They 
substantiate this assertion by arguing that the level of sanctions imposed by the sanctioning 
country is a function of the relative political influence of the pro-sanctions and the anti-
sanctions groups within that country. Malloy et al. (1990) affirm that public perception 




pronouncement might not be reflective of the real objective. That means, in some cases, the 
reason communicated by the sender publicly might not be the real objective for imposing 
sanctions. 
1.7.3 Have Sanctions Been Successful? 
Evaluating whether sanctions have been successful is often an exercise riddled with 
controversy. Hufbauer et al. (1985), in their leading publication, measure the success of 
sanctions as a function of the extent to which the policy objectives were achieved and the extent 
to which sanctions contributed thereto. According to Pape’s criteria (1998), sanctions are 
successful when the target state conceded to a significant part of the sender’s demands, 
sanctions were applied before the target changed its behaviour, and there is no other 
explanation for the target changing its behaviour (Pape, 1998). Both these perspectives offer 
useful tools to evaluate the impact of economic sanctions but the approaches that they use are 
contested by other scholars in the field (Lam, 1990; Drury, 1998; Hart, 2000). 
The type of sanctions imposed influences the effectiveness of sanctions. Financial sanctions 
and trade sanctions differently affect small countries (Dollery, 1993). Financial sanctions affect 
capital-intensive import sectors whereas trade sanctions affect the labour-intensive sectors of 
the economy through income and substitution effects. The extent to which the financial 
sanctions affect the economy depends on the extent to which the target country can replace or 
dispense with foreign sources of capital (Kaempfer & Loewenberg, 2007). This is revisited in 
more detail in Section 9.2. 
1.7.4 What Factors Influence the Effectiveness of Sanctions? 
It is not only the approach to determine if sanctions were effective, but it is also the factors that 
explain whether sanctions were effective. Hufbauer et al. (1990) go on to analyse the 
characteristics that explain why the sanctions were effective, including the type of sanctions, 
the characteristics of the target state, the senders involved, the motivation of the senders, and 
the relationships between the target, sender, and third-party states before the sanctions are 
imposed. Their findings are compared in the literature review to those of other scholars that 




According to Hufbauer et al. (1990) and Kaemfer and Loewenberg (2007), the following 
factors contribute positively toward the effectiveness of economic sanctions: the political 
instability of the target, economic weakness of the target, strong relationship (and strong trade 
linkages) between the sender and target before the imposition of the sanctions, and a strong 
democracy. The following factors bear negatively on its effectiveness: involvement of more 
than one sender country, assistance by third-party states to targets, duration of sanctions (the 
shorter the duration, the more effective the sanctions), and the size of the sender relative to that 
of the target. This factors an effective proxy to understand why some countries agree to change 
their policy direction after they had sanctions imposed on them while others do not. 
1.7.5 Regulating Sanctions 
Comprehensive sanctions could lead to terrible effects on the economy. Economic deterioration 
in the target states could lead to worsening the position of the middle class, the departure of 
the intellectual elite, and a challenging business environment (Portela, 2014). Isolation caused 
by sanctions could frustrate civil society groups and the political opposition. Unintended 
consequences have led to a request for greater regulation against economic sanctions. For 
example, the humanitarian crisis in Haiti, Iraq, and former Yugoslavia can be directly attributed 
to the sanctions in the 1990s (Crawford & Klotz, 1999). The terrible effects of these 
humanitarian crises harmed the innocent citizens of these countries. 
Economic sanctions are often criticised for their humanitarian impact on innocent people 
within the targeted countries (Cortright & Lopez, 1991). Allen and Lektzian (2012) found that 
sanctions could have severe public health consequences, resembling those associated with war. 
Wesbrot and Sachs’ (2019) assessment of Venezuela reveals that sanctions led to a reduction 
in the average calory intake, increased disease and mortality, and displaced millions of citizens 
(Sachs, 2019). Afesorgbor (2019) further elaborates that essential products such as food and 
medical supplies are adversely affected by economic sanctions. Hence, target states suffer 
detrimental such as increases in malnutrition, infectious diseases, and infant mortality, as was 
experienced in Yugoslavia and Iraq (Afesorgbor, 2019). Given the grave consequences that 
sanctions could have on a country and its citizens, a school of thought advocates the greater 
regulation of sanctions (Afesorgbor, 2019). Most of the countries mentioned by these scholars 
suffered from a lack of economic growth and political turmoil before the imposition of 




There is a strong assertion by some scholars that there should be consequences for the 
unintended harm caused by economic sanctions. For example, Frank (2006) states that 
countries that impose sanctions should be prosecuted for war crimes when they harm innocent 
people. Winkler (1999) specifically mentions that countries that impose sanctions must be 
bound by the “Just War Doctrine” (Winkler, 1999). The “Just War Doctrine” are guiding 
principles to regulate armed conflict that has been evolving since initially conceived by St 
Augustine from the Christian doctrine of war (Miller, 1964). It outlines that the war must have 
a just cause, it must be lawful, and the intention must be good, all other options exhausted, 
have a reasonable chance of success, and be used in a reasonable proportion to the end. 
Frank (2006) argues that if sanctions were regarded as a type of warfare, they would fall under 
related international regulations. The senders could then be charged for committing crimes 
against innocent people. Webrot and Sachs (2019) provide further legal justification in the 
Venezuela case by arguing that “it be defined as collective punishment of the civilian 
population as described in both the Geneva and Hague international conventions, to which the 
US is a signatory”. 
Beyond individual casualties, sanctions could also adversely affect entrepreneurship and small 
businesses. For example, the US and EC’s sanctions against Russia aim to stop the 
advancement into Ukraine, and they target Russia’s financial system. This constrained Russia’s 
financial capital and crowded out small players (Oxenstierna & Olsson, 2015). More broadly, 
sanctions could bring about severe economic disruption, including hyperinflation and 
unemployment, which, in turn, result in poverty, malnutrition, and death (Winkler, 1999). This 
indicates that the broad devastation on the economy also affects private players that are integral 
to any economy. 
1.7.6 Smart Sanctions: How to Limit the Unintended Consequences and Improve the 
Effectiveness 
There are three types of smart sanctions that could be implemented, namely personal sanctions, 
selective sanctions, and diplomatic measures. Personal sanctions are self-explanatory; they 
directly affect exclusive individuals (Portela, 2014). These sanctions ban the travel of 
blacklisted individuals, issuing of visas, and freezing their financial assets abroad. Selective 




specific commodities. Diplomatic sanctions include banning the membership in an 
international organisation or the recall of ambassadors or limitation of contracts (Portela, 
2014). Another example of diplomatic sanctions is the banning of SA sports teams from 
participating in international games. 
The intention behind smart sanctions is to negatively affect the ruling elite so that they submit 
to the wishes of the sender. There is a view that sanctions work if they have a desired impact 
on the ruling elite (Kaempfer & Loewenberg, 2007). Rose (2005) argues that punitive measures 
of sanctions must be used alongside incentives for concessions by the target country. Beladi 
and Oladi (2015) argue that sanctions should be focused on influential people that can change 
government policies instead of blanket sanctions that affect innocent citizens indiscriminately 
(Beladi & Oladi , 2015). Allen and Lektzian (2012) motivate that sanctions must be focused 
on the elite rather than having unintended consequences such as health effects on the general 
population. The impact of the Iranian oil boycott was an example of smart sanctions because 
the reduction in the proceeds from oil and gas created an incentive for the elite to change (Dizaji 
& Van Bergeijk, 2013). Most of those that argue for smart sanctions do so without providing 
examples of where they have been effective; the Iranian oil boycott is a unique case that cannot 
be generalised. 
The mechanics of how smart sanctions lead to change is quite interesting, with Beladi and 
Oladi (2015) arguing that the inclusion incentives further strengthen this approach. Beladi and 
Oladi (2015) argue that smart sanctions lead to more compliance because they target those in 
the country who can influence the government’s conduct (Galtung, 1983). Cortright and Lopez 
(1999) refer to this as carrot-and-stick diplomacy, which is designed to resolve conflict and 
bring about a negotiated solution. Iraq and Yugoslavia are often used as what Beladi and Oladi 
(2015) term smart sanctions. The Iraq Oil-For-Food programme is an example of a framework 
focusing on the process of negotiation and concessions for partial compliance. These smart 
sanctions require rigorous continuous assessment and review to allow for adjustment if 
necessary (Burgdorf, 2009). It is unclear from this assessment how incentives could be 
generalised for each situation where one nation wants another to change its policy or stop a 
specific action. 
Theoretically, targeted sanctions correct the unintended consequences of sanctions because 




and they should not target goods required to ensure the basic subsistence of the civilian 
population, nor essential medical provisions or educational material of any kind (Bossuyt, 
1999). The relevance of the smart sanctions approach is that it looks to identify ways to reduce 
the unintended consequences on innocent civilians. 
1.7.7 What is South Africa’s Experience with Sanctions? 
SA has a long history of having sanctions imposed against it as a punitive measure against the 
apartheid policy/racial discrimination and to encourage policy change. Most of the sanctions 
before 1985 were by individual nations and non-economic. The earliest sanctions were 
imposed in 1946 by India through a trade embargo (Manby, 1992). Soon after, African 
countries gained independence in the 1960s, and applied unilateral sanctions against SA 
(Manby, 1992). Both India and other African countries were small trade partners of SA and 
these sanctions were on limited products. 
In 1963, a UNSC resolution recommended that members stop the shipment of arms to SA. It 
was a voluntary arms embargo because the US and UK opposed any broader actions against 
the apartheid government (Roekel, 2016). These voluntary arms embargoes were not economic 
sanctions. Japan implemented a unilateral ban on direct investment in 1964. Although this was 
a significant measure, Japan was not a major investor in SA at the time. 
Throughout the 1970s, there were widespread consumer boycotts in the US, which escalated 
after the 1976 Soweto uprising (Manby, 1992). In 1973, OPEC, through a request by the 
Organisation for African Unity, imposed an oil embargo on SA (Manby, 1992). OPEC 
introduced an oil embargo against all supporters of Israel. The oil embargo negatively affected 
aspects of the South African economy but it was not a comprehensive punitive measure on SA. 
Weak sanctions were imposed in 1973 by the UN aimed at limited the purchasing of arms 
(Manby, 1992). Following the Soweto 1976 violence against scholars, the OPEC oil embargo 
was followed by a mandatory UN arms embargo in 1977. In the US, some companies instituted 
the Sullivan Principles, which made it difficult to raise new loans for the SA government 
(Manby, 1992). Another measure in the 1970s was the restriction or prohibition of loans by 
Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland (Roekel, 2016). At this stage, action 




countries that were not major trading partners of SA. Most importantly, these were not 
comprehensive economic sanctions by major trade partners. 
Multinational institutions and major trade partners started to act against SA in the 1980s. The 
first international financial institution sanctions were implemented in 1983 by the IMF (Roekel, 
2016). The IMF refused to grant additional funds to SA in 1983 because of an initiative led by 
the US Congressional Black Caucus (Crawford & Klotz, 1999). This was a once-off action 
rather than economic sanctions imposed for a period. 
A 1984 UNSC Resolution instituted a voluntary arms embargo (Crawford & Klotz, 1999). The 
UN called for the end of discrimination, release of political prisoners, and a move toward a 
peaceful transformation (Crawford & Klotz, 1999). These were not economic sanctions nor 
were they compulsory, so they are not considered for the period of analysis. 
Starting in 1985, major economic sanctions were instituted by multilateral institutions and 
important trade partners to SA (Manby, 1992). The UN had a voluntary ban on new investment, 
trade, and other economic activities against SA (Manby, 1992). The UN requested that member 
states should impose additional sanctions to supplement the voluntary sanctions (Manby, 
1992). The EC agreed to participate in the arms and oil embargoes. In August 1985, SA’s major 
lenders refused to refinance the short-term debt, leading to the rand depreciating by half 
(Manby, 1992). Later in 1985, the Nordic Council (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and 
Sweden) imposed sanctions on new investments and selected imports from SA. These actions 
by the UN, EC, Nordic Council, and major lenders are considered the start of the 
comprehensive economic sanctions on SA by multinational institutions. The sanctions starting 
in 1985 are considered the first severe sanctions episode against SA (refer to Table 3.1 
definition of sanctions) (Manby, 1992). 
SA’s woes worsened when the US also piled on with its economic sanctions. The US Congress 
passed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) in 1986. The CAAA banned trade 
with SA of certain products and financial transactions (new investments including loans) 
(Manby, 1992; United States General Accounting Office, 1992). Also, in 1986, several 
international companies divested in SA, including Barclays Bank (the UK’s largest investor in 
SA) (Evenett, 2002). Other important trade partners to SA such as the EC, Commonwealth, 




1987, Sweden and Norway imposed comprehensive trade and investment bans on SA (Evenett, 
2002). Great Britain and Germany opted not to impose any binding sanctions (Ch. Hefti, 1998). 
The CAAA remained in place until 1991 when it was removed by President Bush after the five 
conditions were met. Given the US’s position as a strategic trade partner, Evenett (2002) found 
that the US sanctions had the strongest influence on SA (Evenett, 2002). 
The effectiveness and efficiency of the sanctions against SA from the mid-1980s is contentious. 
Sanctions should lead countries to make policy changes due to the reduction of available 
resources to them (Burgdorf, 2009). The sanctions implemented against SA were mild until the 
1980s when the UN, EC, EU, and US seriously participated. Britain and the US’s, the two main 
trading partners of SA, reluctance to participate in earlier sanctions explains why the earlier 
sanctions were weaker (Roekel, 2016). The significance of comprehensive economic sanctions 
by the UN is that Neuenkirch and Neumeier (2014) found that the imposition of UN sanctions 
decreases the target state’s annual GDP per capita by more than 2% and that the effect lasts for 
10 years and leads to an aggregate decline in the target countries’ GDP per capita of 25.5%. 
More specifically, Neuenkirch and Neumeier (2014) found that comprehensive UN economic 
sanctions have the most detrimental mental effect on a country’s real GDP growth. 
The key differentiator between these sanctions between earlier periods is that they were 
economic, comprehensive, imposed by multilateral institutions, and strategic unilateral parties. 
Previous cases were much milder because they did not include economic sanctions by strategic 
trade partners such as the US. More importantly, earlier sanctions were selective and limited; 
while the sanctions during this period were comprehensive (financial and trade) affecting SA’s 
economy more broadly. 
Unilateral sanctions started to be lifted after the unbanning of the ANC, and release of Nelson 
Mandela and other prisoners in 1990 (Evenett, 2002). In 1991, there were further repeals of 
three laws (the Land Act, the Group Areas Act, and the Population Registration Act) central to 
the apartheid regime (Evenett, 2002). The repeals of these laws were key conditions for the 
sanctions imposed by the UN and EC. 
The UN’s economic sanctions remained until 1994, while other sender countries such as the 
US (1991), ended their sanctions earlier in the 1990s. For example, Japan also ended sanctions 




1993, the General Assembly requested the removal of economic sanctions against SA when 
the Transitional Executive Council in SA become operational (Evenett, 2002). It, however, was 
only in 1994 when the Security Council adopted a resolution to remove all remaining US 
sanctions against SA (Security Council Report, 2013). 1994, therefore, is the ended data of 
sanctions for this research paper. 
The end of apartheid is attributed to a series of factors and not solely the impact of sanctions. 
For example, Levy (1999) argues that the end of apartheid could be attributed to the 
effectiveness of political opposition, the inefficiency of the economy, and the fall of the Soviet 
Union. The latter was triggered by the fall of communism in Eastern Europe (Levy, 1999). This 
paper does not wish to enter the debate but solely indicate there were other critical factors that 





CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
The literature on economic sanctions focuses on a wide array of questions, including defining 
what they are, what they hope to achieve, how effective they have been, analysing the 
humanitarian effects, and recommending alternative ways to improve the effectiveness and 
minimise unintended consequences. The research on the effectiveness of economic sanctions 
was conducted by empirical quantitative research. This research uses a qualitative economic 
and or political theory to inform how the quantitative method is designed (Kaempfer & 
Loewenberg, 2007; Neuenkirch & Neumeier, 2014). The other research questions regarding 
economic sanctions evaluate each determinant of effectiveness in detail, for example, the role 
of third parties in determining the effectiveness of sanctions. This research used a wide range 
of research techniques, including political theory, game theory, macroeconomic theory, law, 
and psychology (Cortright & Lopez, 2001; Rose, 2005; Beladi & Oladi, 2015). This section 
will critically analyse the literature on the economic cost of sanctions, identify the gaps that 
currently exist, and areas for future studies. 
This chapter will first review the existing theories on the impact of sanctions. Second, it will 
analyse the literature on economic cost of sanctions, and last, review the literature on sanctions 
against SA. 
2.2 Review of Existing Theories on the Impact of Sanctions 
Sanctions are an alternative or supplementary punitive measure, to war and diplomacy, against 
a target country. After the end of World War 2, sanctions were used more widely against 
governments to encourage policy change or for the target to stop undesired behaviours. Given 
the almost 40-year track record from the late 1940s to 1980s, scholars started to interrogate its 
effectiveness as a policy measure in the mid-1980s. This section evaluates the theories that 
were derived regarding this work. 
Early studies on economic sanctions focus on explaining the factors that make sanctions 
successful. In their revision of the 1985 study, Hufbauer et al. (1990) evaluated the goal of the 
sender, relative economic strength, economic stability of the target, the relationship between 




parties, and the duration of the sanctions. They found that the following pre-conditions are 
associated with successful cases: the goal is relatively modest, the target country is much 
smaller than the country imposing the sanctions and economically unstable, the sender and 
target conducted substantial trade, the sanctions are imposed quickly, and the sender avoids 
high cost to itself. Moberly (1988) supports Hufbauer et al.’s (1990) assertion that the objective 
of the sanctions affects its ability to be effective. These findings by Hufbauer et al. (1990) were 
developed using detailed case studies of all sanctions during the period of study; it was the 
most comprehensive study of sanctions at the time. 
A major criticism of the analytical approach by Hufbauer et al. (1990) is static (evaluate the 
cost of sanctions during the period they are imposed) and does not compare determinants over 
time and across periods. Instead of taking a static view on sanctions, Mirkina (2018) finds that 
the effect of sanctions on foreign investment changes over time, depending on “sanctions costs, 
primary sanctions imposer, and the decade”. For example, sanctions imposed in the 1990s 
negatively affected the FDI in the short-term, but the effect dissipated in the long-term. 




Table 2.1: Factors that Influence the Effectiveness of Sanctions 














































































































































        +               
Political instability of target + +   +             + 
Economic weakness of target + +                 + 
Cordial pre-sanction ties + +       +         + 
Cost of sanctions to target + + +   +   + +       
Trade linkages between sender and 
target   -                   
Multilateral cooperation among 
senders                       
Third-party assistance to target             -         
Ambitiousness of sanctions goal         - - -         
Sender is frequent sanctioner         -             
Size of sender relative to target                     - 
Trade versus financial sanctions -   - + -   -         
Duration of sanctions -     -         -     
Democratic versus autocratic                 + +   
Notes: The table shows variables that influence the effectiveness of sanctions. For each author, it indicates if they 
found a positive (+) or a negative (-) relationship. A blank cell means that no relationship was found. The table 
allows us to evaluate the trends between the findings of the authors. (Kaempfer & Loewenberg, 2007) 
Table 2.1 indicates that since the publication by Hufbauer et al. (1990) several authors analysed 
the determinants of the effectiveness of sanctions. The findings, which are supported by other 
authors, are regarding the role of political instability, political weakness of the target, the 
relationship before the sanctions, and the cost of the sanctions to the target, positively 
contributing to effectiveness (Lam, 1990; Van Bergeijk, 1994; Jing et al., 2003). Furthermore, 
using financial sanctions for about three years was also more likely to make sanctions more 
effective than trade sanctions that lasted for nine years (Deheija & Wood, 1992; Dashti-Gibson 
et al., 1997; Bolk & Al-Sowayel, 2000). There is no consensus on trade linkages, multilateral 
cooperation, assistance from third parties, the goal of the target, and the relative sizes. Despite 
no consensus being found about the role of third parties, it will be evaluated in more detail in 
the next section. SA was resilient due to its ability to circumvent unilateral sanctions by being 




Scholars such as Drury (1998) evaluated Hufbauer et al.’s (1990) findings and found interesting 
results. According to Drury’s analysis, only four of Hufbauer et al.’s policy recommendations 
are supported by the results, namely: 1) a large difference in the sizes of the economy is not a 
significant predictor of the likelihood of sanctions being successful; 2) well-coordinated 
multination sanctions are more effective than unilateral sanctions; 3) the cost to the target as a 
percentage of its gross national product (GNP) has a significantly positive effect on success; 
and 4) target countries with weak economies tended to succumb to sanctions more often than 
strong, healthy targets (Drury, 1998). Following up on the third recommendation, Hufbauer et 
al. (1990) found that the average cost to the target in successful cases was 2.4% of its GNP and 
in failures it was only 1.0%. 
2.2.1 How Long must Sanctions be Imposed for them to be Effective? 
The debate around the effectiveness of sanctions also included the debate around the length of 
sanctions; how long does it take for them to work? Hufbauer et al. (1990) found that successful 
sanctions endured on average 2.9 years versus 8.0 years in the case of failures. A major 
implication from Afesorgbor’s paper (2019) is that when a threat is made before the imposition 
of sanctions, it can undermine the effectiveness of sanctions. The passing of time gives the 
country enough time to adopt strategies that could counteract the negative effects (e.g., 
stockpiling) (Afesorgbor, 2019). Afesorgbor (2019) affirms that sanctions that last for longer 
periods are less successful. SA has a long history of sanctions but the most comprehensive 
economic sanctions by the US, UN, EC, and other strategic partners lasted for nine years, from 
1985 to 1994. Nine years is nearly triple the period that successful sanctions endure. 
2.2.2 Multilateral versus unilateral sanctions 
The fourth policy recommendation by Hufbauer et al. (1990) was that well-organised sanctions 
by multinational organisations are more successful than unilateral sanctions. Unilateral 
sanctions create a smaller deterioration in the target’s terms of trade than those involving 
numerous participant countries. (Kaempfer & Loewenberg, 2007). The significance of the 
sanctions imposed on SA in 1985 by the EC and Nordic Alliance is that they were compulsory 




2.3 Economic Cost of Sanctions 
In the previous section, the discussion was on the overall factors that determine the 
effectiveness of sanctions. This sub-section deep-dives into the economic cost of sanctions, not 
only from the perspective of effectiveness but also the impact on the economy of the target 
state. Sanctions impose costs on the economy in several ways. Of course, this depends on the 
type of sanctions that have been imposed. First, sanctions lead to the reduction of the benefits 
associated with trade. Second, sanctions lead to withdraws of foreign sources of capital. Third, 
sanctions could cause productive inefficiency by increasing the cost and availability of key 
inputs (Blumenfeld, 1987). These are the primary mechanisms that economic sanctions could 
impose costs on the target country. 
The methodologies to evaluate the economic costs of sanctions are varied. Neuenkirch and 
Neumeier (2014) evaluate the impact of sanctions on GDP growth using econometric 
modelling. The IMF and Davies (2018) also used econometric modelling to assess the impact 
of sanctions on economies. The case study approach was applied to several sanctions’ episodes, 
including Russia. More recently, Mirkina (2018) applied the SCM to assess the impact on 
Russia’s exports, while Gharehgozli (2017) used the SCM to assess the impact of sanctions on 
Iran’s GDP. Each of these approaches is expanded on below.  
Shin and Choi (2015) evaluated the impact of sanctions by using a cross-national, time series 
data analysis of 133 countries during the period 1970 to 2005 to determine if economic 
sanctions impaired these targeted economies. Shin and Choi (2015) found that regardless of 
the number of senders, the type of sanctions or the level of anticipated costs to the target and 
the sender, sanctions do not damage the economic conditions (international trade, FDI and 
portfolio flows) of the target. According to Shin and Choi (2015), this happens because MNC 
does not “rally around the flag” but instead conducts business as usual with sanctioned 
countries because they are profit seeking organisations rather than politically motivated 
entities.  
Neuenkirch and Neumeier (2014) used econometric modelling to evaluate the impact of US 
and UN Economic Sanctions on GDP growth. They assessed 68 countries between 1976 and 
2012 (Neuenkirch & Neumeier, 2014). They found that UN sanctions led to a decrease in the 




Interestingly, they found that the adverse effect lasts for approximately 10 years. The impact 
of US sanctions was small (0.5% –0.9%). The econometric approach is useful because it allows 
for the specific characteristics of the target and sender countries to be factored in and the nature 
of the sanctions are incorporated into the model. Critics against the econometric model argue 
that it has more historic explanatory usefulness rather than predictive relevance. These models 
can derive insights based on past events. They, however, have limited predictive relevance 
because the selected discrete variables will always be up for debate. 
The economic cost of previous episodes of economic sanctions is often easier to quantify. 
Davis (2018) evaluated the average cost of sanctions and derived an econometric model to 
evaluate the average cost of sanctions depending on the characteristics of that specific episode 
and country (Davies, 2018). For example, Davis (2018) estimated that the 2014–2017 sanctions 
on Russia reduced the GDP by 2–2.5%, and the economy is projected to grow at 1.5–1.7% 
until 2023, which is lower than global growth estimations of 3.7–3.9%  
The macroeconomic models were used by the IMF to estimate the reduction in growth in 
Russia because of sanctions. They attempt to do this while also indicating the effect of other 
factors such as the lower oil price and restrictive macroeconomic policies (Korhonen, 2019 ). 
The effects of sanctions were also evaluated through a structural auto-regressive model that 
can delineate the effect of sanctions during different periods. They found the negative effect 
most pronounced during 2014–16 (Korhonen, 2019 ). 
Evidence of research to estimate the cost of sanctions that were not imposed is limited. An 
example is when the former Russian Minister of Finance, Alexei Kudrin, stated that sanctions 
lead to a 1–1.5% drop in the GDP (Smeets, 2018). The facts to derive this conclusion are not 
publicly available. It did, however, reveal the view of the Russian government’s evaluation of 
the threat. In another example, the US Treasury Secretary, Jacob Lew, estimated the cost of the 
2011 sanctions on Iran to have caused a 15–20% contraction in the economy (Smeets, 2018). 
There was a two-year recession in Iran following the US sanctions imposition, the currency 
(Rial) depreciated by 56% over those two years, and unemployment reached record levels. 
These estimations by both the target and sender government seem to have a much more 




A counterfactual analysis based on the econometric model was used to assess the effect of 
sanctions on the EC countries’ exports to Russia (Korhonen, 2019). This analysis also segments 
the impact by sector and found that the largest drop in exports was in agricultural goods. The 
cases of Burundi, Iran and Russia show different perspectives on how economic sanctions may 
affect target nations (Dom & Roger, 2020;  Kokabisaghi, 2018).  
Based on the outcome of Burundi’s 2015 sanctions, Dom and Roger (2020) maintain that 
sanctions do not have an economic impact on the economy because governments have several 
fiscal levers they can use. The sanctions on Burundi cut the access to aid but instead led to an 
increase in domestic borrowing. The Burudian government was able to withstand the sanctions 
and deliver its spending commitments by substituting domestic debt for aid. This indicates that 
the economic costs of sanctions do not necessarily translate into political costs but are affected 
by the fiscal responses that are available to government (Dom & Roger, 2020). 
On the other hand, sanctions against Iran caused the country’s revenues to fall, a devaluation 
of national currency and an increase in inflation and unemployment (Kokabisaghi, 2018). 
Kakobiasghi (2018) argues that the impact of sanctions not only directly affects the economy 
but also translates into a pronounced deterioration in the quality of life.   
According to Tyll (2018), the impact of sanctions on the economy of Russia was made worse 
by that country’s dependence on oil exports. There was a large capital outflow from Russia as 
a result of the sanctions imposed due to the Ukraine crisis but the study finds that the economic 
condition of Russia was also affected by its dependence on oil exports and the oil prices at the 
time (Tyll, 2018). The exchange rate management also had negative effects on the disposable 
income of citizens.  
These three case studies show us that the unique attributes of each country explain the 
economic cost of sanctions and that the appetite of governments to use alternative sources of 
liquidity will also influence the impact of sanctions on their economies.  
The SCM was recently used as an alternative approach to measure the economic cost of 
sanctions for a single country. The method was developed by Abadie and Gargeazalbal (2003) 
to evaluate the impact of the Basque war on the economic performance of the region. Mirkina 
(2018) used the SCM to analyse the economic cost of sanctions in examining the effects of 




sanctions on Iran’s GDP (Barseghyan, 2019). This new approach provides a new way of 
analysing the economic cost of sanctions. 
2.4 South Africa’s Experience with Economic Sanctions – What was the Impact? 
SA has been a case study of interest for evaluating sanctions due to the long history of sanctions 
against the apartheid government. Crawford and Klots (1999) authored a book that analysed 
the efficacy of sanctions as a policy tool and the role it played in SA’s transitions. The book, 
How Sanctions Work: Lessons from South Africa, starts by providing the historical context of 
sanctions globally and then go on to explain how different types of sanctions were imposed on 
SA (Crawford & Klotz, 1999). 
The reaction of the SA government to sanctions is well-documented by Mobberley (1988). 
According to Mobberley (1988), the earlier sanctions led to the SA government building a 
“formidable arms industry, developing oil substitutes, and purchasing oil through third 
parties”. This explains why the SA government persisted with apartheid despite the earlier arms 
and oil embargoes that were imposed during the late 1970s. 
Levy argues that it is particularly challenging to measure with any sort of precision the impact 
of the sanctions, given that the economic growth slowed down from 5.4% in the prior decades 
to 1.8% in the period 1974–1987. It, therefore, could have been the weakening economic 
situation due to international pressure that contributed to the government changing its position. 
Before the imposition of the sanctions by the UN and US Congress, the major debate was 
around the likely effectiveness and appropriateness of economic sanctions (Minter, 1986). 
Minter (1986) argues that there was a false dichotomy in the sanctions debate and that the 
government rarely accurately communicates its motivation for sanctions. According to Minter 
(1986), the sanctions debate often underestimates the consequences because they do not 
consider the long-term consequences, cumulative impact, and interactions with other factors 
that influence economic and political confidence (Minter, 1986). Moberly (1988) expected US 
sanctions on SA to have a “clear impact on the export industry, lower new investment, slow 
growth, exchange rate depreciation, and job losses.” 
Kaempfer, Lehmen and Loewenberg (1987) explain how disinvestment affects the economy in 




foreign investors withdraw, it will lead to a fall in the capital prices, but the returns stay the 
same. South Africans will continue to invest if they realise a higher rate of return. 
Disinvestment alone, therefore, is expected to lead to an increase in the wealth of white SA 
capital owners, which enables the state to generate additional revenues (Kaempfer et al., 1987). 
In the long-term, there is a loss of productivity due to depreciation, and the loss of skilled 
foreign nations are expected to have a detrimental loss depending on the extent to which they 
are used alongside trade sanctions (Kaempfer et al., 1987). 
SA’s dependence on foreign capital rendered it especially vulnerable to the imposition of 
sanctions that limited access to capital markets (Levy, 1999). During the sanctions period, most 
of SA’s debt was short-term, making SA vulnerable to refinancing risk. Foreign capital was 
vital to the SA economy to fund the state-owned enterprises (SOEs), develop infrastructure, 
and growth in the mining sector (Lopez, 2001). The Overseas Development Institute (1986) 
purports that the structure of the SA economy made it vulnerable to sanctions. This 
vulnerability was due to the reliance on foreign FDI, dependence on foreign short-term debt, 
commodity export-led economy (particularly gold sector), and the exchange rate regime 
(Overseas Development Institute, 1986). 
Love (1998) and Coulibaly (2009) also concluded that SA appeared vulnerable to sanctions 
due to its size, dependence on the global economy, and most of its trade being with the West. 
In the 1960s, the total liabilities were made up of 45% FDI, 40% loans, and the remainder were 
made by portfolio investments (Coulibaly, 2009). By 1985, total foreign liabilities as a 
percentage of GDP increased by 17% to 70% and even worse, the share of loans had increased 
to 60% with 70% of them maturing within a year (Coulibaly, 2009). According to Coulibaly 
(2009), the shift in liabilities from FDI and portfolio to debt reflected foreign investors’ desire 
to reduce their risk exposure to SA, leaving the country to rely on loans to meet its investment 
needs. 
This vulnerability was exposed when in 1985, the international lenders refused to refinance 
60% of the foreign debt. To make matters worse, most of these lenders adopted policies of not 





The major trade partners (US, UK, West Germany, Japan, and Italy) accounted for over 80% 
of trade with SA (Manby, 1992). Although the US participated in the sanctions process through 
CAAA, other major trade partners such as the UK and West German resisted the adoption of 
compulsory and strong economic sanctions. Louw (1995) states that sanctions of the 1980s 
could not cause any real damage to the economy. Louw (1995) also found that sanctions had a 
short-term impact on selected exports. Most interestingly, Louw (1995) contends that the 
sanctions were deliberately intended to have a minimal impact. According to Hefti and 
Staehelin-Witt (1998), trade sanctions imposed a greater impact on SA than financial sanctions 
did. SA could still avoid the full cost of the trade sanctions by selling to new customers or 
changing the specifications of the product (Ch. Hefti, 1998). 
Trade sanctions also had a serious and long-lasting effect on the SA economy. SA’s exports 
stagnated while world trade increased, the cost of selling to non-sanctioning countries affected 
the profitability, and for some products, SA was forced to sell at a discount to maintain its 
market share (United States General Accounting Office, 1992). The country also had a higher 
interest rate than the market rate. Sanctions also cause inefficiencies in the target economy 
when new industries must be created to substitute for more expensive or scarce imports. For 
example, the multilateral oil and arms embargoes against SA led to opaque investments in 
expensive and inefficient arms and synthetic fuel industries (United States General Accounting 
Office, 1992). Import substitution industries are achieved at an opportunity cost to more 
strategically advantageous industries (Bossuyt, 1999). Taxation to raise money for these import 
substitution industries also distorts investment patterns (United States General Accounting 
Office, 1992). 
Rodman (1994) highlights that private sector organisations and individuals played a pivotal 
role in ensuring the success of sanctions. Actions of the public (citizenry of the sender) are 
always more effective when they are supplemented by some type of public policy (Rodman, 
1994). Manby (1992) also indicates that punitive action against SA during the 1980s was 
imposed by international organisations, individual governments, and non-state institutions. 
The evaluation of the economic cost of sanctions on SA during the period differs in the 
approach to estimate the impact. Crawford and Klotz (1999) estimate that although trade fell 
with major trade partners during the period, it also increased with others (e.g., Japan increased 




decisions of countries and corporations rested more on the strategic nature of the relevant 
industry; they were more likely to ban goods for industries they were trying to protect locally. 
The increasing political uncertainty and poor economic climate in SA made the economy a 
poor investment destination (Manby, 1992). According to Hefti and Staehelin-Witt (1998), SA 
suffered a net outflow of R16.2bn during the sanctions period but this disinvestment trend 
started before the introduction of the 1985 sanctions. The largest net capital outflow occurred 
in 1985 before the imposition of economic sanctions by the US in 1986 (Ch. Hefti, 1998). 
According to Hefti and Staehelin-Wit (1998), the official sanctions had limited impact on 
capital outflow because they were on new investments and not enacted as compulsory by all 
trade partners. The fundamentals did not stack up, and irrespective of a willingness to 
participate in the sanction, it did not make financial sense to continue investing in SA for 
investors (Levy, 1999). Interestingly, over 80% of all FDI in SA during the period was 
reinvested profits, not new investment. Halon (1990) found evidence of the impact of sanctions, 
including 7% of trade being cut, selling coal at lower prices, disinvestment associated with no 
new investments, capital outflows, and no access to loans (Halon, 1990). 
Most of the literature on economic sanctions in SA were written during the period where 
sanctions were imposed. Few studies such as Hefti and Staehelin-Witt (1998) reflect on the 
conclusion of these sanctions. Another paper that was written after sanctions ended was by 
Coulibaly (2009). It analysed the effect of sanctions on investment and economic growth using 
time series data of the SA economy. The results of the study found that sanctions did negatively 
affect the economy (Coulibaly, 2009). 
The end of sanctions was gradual, with some sanctions relaxed after the release of Nelson 
Mandela in 1990 (Crawford & Klotz, 1999). The CAAA remained in place until 1991 when 
they were removed by President Bush after the five conditions were met. The UN sanctions, 
however, were only lifted in 1994 in the year that democratic elections took place. 
2.5 Conclusion 
A significant gap in the analysis is that none of the existing literature estimates the economic 
cost of sanctions by comparing the growth path (GDP per capita) after the imposition of 
sanctions versus had sanctions not been imposed for SA. Those that evaluate the cost of 




considering the long-term effects. The new trend of using the SCM offers an opportunity to 
apply the same methodology to the South African case in the 1980s. Past studies offer useful 
explanatory variables. The literature evaluates the level of effectiveness, explains the features 
that contribute to this effectiveness, identifies the unintended consequences, and conducts 
individual case studies. These explanatory tools could be used to explain the size of the 
economic costs found by using the SCM to the SA case. This research paper aims to focus on 







CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY  
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter will first introduce the SCM, evaluate it against other comparable methods, and 
explain how it will be used in the rest of the paper. The previous chapter (literature review) 
briefly highlighted how this approach was used to evaluate economic sanctions in the past. An 
evaluation of comparable methods elaborates on the advantages and disadvantages of the SCM 
over others (case study, trial-and-error, difference-in-difference). Last, the key units of measure 
are defined, data sources are provided, and the logic behind the equation to be used for the 
analysis is also discussed. 
3.2 Synthetic Control Method 
To evaluate if a policy is effective, researchers often study the impact of a policy decision. The 
SCM is well-regarded as an effective approach that could help to evaluate the effectiveness of 
policies (McClelland & Gault, 2017). It has been applied in single country and multi-country 
evaluation papers across a wide series of topics. 
SCM is an econometric technique that performs data-driven and transparent comparative case 
studies (Billmeier & Nannicini, 2013). The SCM provides a method to compare the real 
economic trend of a country against a synthetic country that resembles its growth had the 
incident (e.g., sanctions) not occurred (Chelwa, Blecher, & Van Walbeek, 2015). The synthetic 
country would replicate the GDP per capita (the observed variable) that the country would have 
experienced in the absence of sanctions (the intervention). The SCM creates a counterfactual 
region by taking the weighted average of pre-intervention outcomes from selected donor pools 
(McClelland & Gault, 2017), and the quality of inference increases with the number of 
countries available pre-intervention period. Simply put, the effect of sanctions (treatment) is 
estimated by comparing trends in per capita GDP for a country with and without sanctions 
(Pchelintsev, 2019). It is an appropriate technique to use for what this research paper is 
endeavouring to achieve. 
The SCM is a relatively new technique that was introduced in 2003 by Abadie and Gardeazabal 
(2003) evaluating the economic cost of the Basque War in the 1960s between Spain and the 




Conflict: A Case Study of the Basque Country, 2003). It was extended by Abadie, Diamone 
and Hainmueller (2010). Billmeier and Nannicini (2013) have since applied the methodology 
to evaluate the impact of liberalising economics. Billmeier and Nannicini (2013) applied the 
method to cross-country econometric techniques to perform comparative case studies. Using 
the synthetic control framework, Billmeier and Nannicini (2013) evaluated if liberalising an 
economy leads to higher economic performance after the intervention when compared to 
similar countries that had not liberalised their economies. 
The SCM was used to analyse the impact of policy interventions in SA. The SCM was used to 
measure the effect of price hikes through tax hikes on cigarette consumption in SA  (Chelwa , 
van Walbeek, & Blecher , 2017) to evaluate the impact of SA’s tobacco control policies from 
1994 to 2004. They do this by estimating SA’s counterfactual cigarette consumption trend line. 
This synthetic SA resembles SA in all relevant aspects, except for the tax hikes. The observed 
outcome variable for the actual SA is compared to the outcome variable for the synthetic SA 
(Chelwa et al., 2015). This research paper offers a useful guide to applying the methodology 
to SA, including the selection of suitable donor pool countries. 
Mirkina (2018) used the SCM to analyse the economic cost of sanctions by examining the 
effects of sanctions on foreign direct investments. Gharehgozli (2017) estimated the economic 
cost of international sanctions imposed on Iran using the SCM. This research paper leverages 
this past work to analyse the economic cost of sanctions on SA’s economic performance. 
Before applying the methodology to the research question, a theoretical explanation of the 
methodology will be provided. Assuming there are J + 1 regions. The region that experiences 
policy change (“1”) is referred to as the treated region. The remaining regions (“J”) do not 
experience any policy change and are used to construct the counterfactual scenario for the 
treated country (Chelwa et al., 2015). These remaining regions are referred to as the donor 
pool. The policy change happens at time T0 with two distinct periods before the intervention 
and with no intervention. Before the intervention (T0), the outcome variable for the treated 
country/synthetic country and the actual country are equal. After the intervention, the impact 
of the policy change in any given year is the difference between the outcome variable of the 




One of the key steps in this approach identifying the appropriate predictors of the outcome 
variable. The appropriate predictors are those with a stable relationship with the outcome 
variable (McClelland & Gault, 2017). The predictors’ ability to explain the variation over the 
pre-treatment years is limited because only their time averages are used when creating the 
synthetic SA (McClelland & Gault, 2017). McClelland and Gault (2017) found studies that 
state having a higher number of predictors compared to donors leads to a better fit. 
The outcome variable for the synthetic country is unobserved for the entire post-
treatment/intervention period. It, therefore, must be estimated by expressing the outcome 
variable of the synthetic country as a weighted average of the countries in the donor pool. First, 
the pre-intervention characteristics of the treated country are recreated using the donor pool. 
Second, the linear combination of regions is used to trace the time path of the outcome variable 
after treatment. This time path is the outcome variable that has been observed for the treated 
region in the absence of the treatment (counterfactual). The resulting synthetic control closely 
matches the treated region before the treatment (sanctions) and is a control for the treated region 
post-treatment (McClelland & Gault, 2017). The estimate of the treatment effect is equal to the 
difference between the counterfactual trend line and the actual trend line (Chelwa et al., 2015). 
Basically, after the treatment effect (sanctions), the difference in the outcomes variable (e.g., 
GDP per capita) between the treated region and its synthetic control estimates the impact of 
sanctions (McClelland & Gault, 2017). 
Chelwa et a. (2015) state a “few conditions have to be met in order to get a close approximation 
of the treated country”. These three conditions are i) regions in the donor pool should not have 
experienced treatment during the relevant time period and the treatment cannot affect the 
outcome in the pool of donor regions (McClelland & Gault, 2017), ii) the outcome variable for 
the regions in the donor pool should be influenced by the same factors as the outcome variable 
for the treated region (convex hull requirements) and iii) the weighted average of the pre-
intervention outcome of the control units is equal to the pre-intervention outcome of the treated 
unit; treatment has no effect before the policy was enacted. These conditions require that the 
donor pool should be influenced by the same factors as the variable outcome variable for the 
treated region (Chelwa et al., 2015). 
Any pre-treatment difference between the treated country and its synthetic country can be 




with their respective weights produces the lowest pre-treatment RMSE between SA and its 
synthetic counterpart (Chelwa et al., 2015). A large RMSE would suggest a poor pre-treatment 
fit between the treated region and its synthetic country (Chelwa et al., 2015). A poor fit is 
typically caused by weak predictors, using outcome variables from turbulent pre-treatment 
years as predictors, or using predictors for which the treated country has extreme values to the 
donor pool (McClelland & Gault, 2017). 
The treatment effects might have been produced by random chance, in which case they would 
not be statistically significantly (Chelwa et al., 2015). Unlike the typical regression models, the 
SCM does provide t-stat or p-value to evaluate the statistical significance. There are three 
criteria to evaluate sensitivity: sensitivity of the fit between the synthetic country and the 
treated country outcome in the pre-treatment period, sensitivity of the synthetic control 
outcome in the treatment period, and sensitivity to the donor pool selection (McClelland & 
Gault, 2017). 
3.3 Comparison with Other Methods 
The alternative methods that can be used to estimate the impact of sanctions on the SA 
economy are case study approach, randomised control trial, difference-in-difference estimator, 
and fixed effects estimator. This section briefly explains each of these approaches and evaluates 
(advantages and disadvantages) them versus SCM. 
A traditional method used for measuring the impact of an event is a randomised control trial. 
This approach takes randomly drawn units from a pool of similar candidates placed in one of 
two groups. One group receives treatment and the second group does not. The treatment effect 
is the difference between the outcome path for the treated group and the control group 
(McClelland & Gault, 2017). The advantage of the SCM is that it does not use a random control 
group to compare against. It uses a much more rigorous approach to select the countries that 
form part of the donor pool. 
Case studies are also often used to solve the problem and efficiency of policies, but they do not 
use quantitative approaches that consider control groups (McClelland & Gault, 2017). The case 
studies sometimes use nearby regions as the control group, but geographic proximity is a poor 
metric for similarity if the “regions have substantial differences in political or cultural 




creating a synthetic control region that simulates what the outcome path of a region would be 
if it did not undergo policy intervention (McClelland & Gault, 2017). 
The fixed effects regression is an estimation technique used with panel data and allows for 
some variables to be constant or change at a constant rate over time (Cavallo, Sebastian , Iian, 
& Juan , 2010). The fixed effects model could contain unobserved confounders even though 
the effects of those confounders are restricted to be constant over time (Cavallo et al., 2010). 
According to Cavallo et al. (2010), the advantage of the SCM is that it allows the effects of 
confounding unobserved characteristics to vary with time. The SCM, however, has several 
other advantages (transparent and no arbitrary assumptions) that will be discussed below. 
The standard difference-in-difference estimator assumes that the effects of the unobserved 
factors are fixed and can, therefore, difference out. It only gives a static average treatment 
effect (Chelwa et al., 2015) while the standard regression estimator assumes that all weights 
are equal to the sum of one. The difference with SCM is that the estimator restricts the weights 
to non-negative numbers, but the regression estimator allows for both positive and negative 
values. By not placing restrictions allows the regression to perfectly fit a counterfactual even 
when the data does not allow for a perfect fit (Chelwa et al., 2015). A criticism labelled against 
the difference-in-difference approach is “it is only valid if the control group units have 
comparable parallel trends. Therefore, estimates may be biased due to the use of state units 
which do not resemble pre-treatment treated unit”. Consequently, the SCM approach is 
preferred because it is a generalisation of the difference-in-differences framework 
(Cunningham & Shah, 2019). 
Another variance between the difference-in-difference approach and SCM is that SCM uses a 
subset of units for controls for comparisons rather than using all controls. The SCM selects 
control countries that exhibit the same pre-treatment dynamics as the treated unit (Cunningham 
& Shah, 2019). 
The SCM is transparent. It allows for an evaluation of how well the synthetic control’s outcome 
matches the treated region’s outcome before the policy change (McClelland & Gault, 2017). 
Furthermore, donor regions and weights assigned to them could be easily accessed to evaluate 




An advantage associated with the SCM is that there are limited arbitrary assumptions to make; 
instead, there is a transparent estimation of the counterfactual outcome of the treated country 
(Billmeier & Nannicini, 2013). The comparison of economies that form the synthetic control 
unit is selected by an algorithm based on their similarity to the treated country before the 
treatment (Billmeier & Nannicini, 2013). The key assumptions are the period of evaluation, 
the selection of the donor pool, and associated weight. There are no assumptions that must be 
made about the economic structure of a specific country, the nature of the sanctions, and the 
likely role of third parties. It is particularly useful because there might not be a country that is 
identical to the primary country of analysis and matches all the set of characteristics 
(Pchelintsev, 2019). The advantage of the SCM is the transparent estimation of the 
counterfactual outcome of the treated country (Billmeier & Nannicini, 2013). 
For alternative approaches for comparative analysis, the common criticism labelled against 
them has always been: how do they account for external events (random shocks) that could 
have also negatively affected the economic growth? (Pchelintsev, 2019). The SCM deals with 
this using a placebo effect. “The placebo test means constructing a synthetic country for all the 
regions in the donor pool, one at a time, and for each region estimating a treatment effect. The 
identified effort for the treated region is statistically significant if the probability of obtaining 
an effect as that of the treated region, in the empirical distribution of treatment effects, is small” 
(Chelwa et al., 2017, p. 109). The placebo test was used to determine if the decrease would 
have been because of the economic sanctions. This will be achieved by comparing the 
evolution of the treatment gap between the treated country and that of the other treatment gaps 
created for the donor pool countries. If the difference is marginal, it would indicate that the 
economic cost of sanctions would likely be caused by the impact of the sanctions. 
Another criticism labelled against SCM is that it does not allow for a large sample such as other 
inferential techniques; the samples are usually quite small compared to comparative methods 
(Billmeier & Nannicini, 2013). The donor pool of countries (refer to Section 4.1) that can be 
used to construct a synthetic SA are limited and hence, the sample size is also smaller compared 
to other techniques. Despite this disadvantage, the advantages make the SCM a suitable 
methodology to apply in this research paper. The next section discusses how the SCM was 




3.4 How Will the SCM Methodology be Applied in this Paper? 
The research is conducted using the SCM, i.e. what was the outcome of a historical event using 
a counterfactual to compare against the actual. The quantitative analysis evaluates the 
economic cost of comprehensive sanctions imposed by the UN, EC, US and other on SA during 
1985–1994 using the counterfactual analysis (Born, Müller, Schularick, & Sedláček , 2019). 
This research paper measures the cost of economic sanctions by comparing SA’s actual 
economic performance and evolution with a synthetic SA’s synthetic control counterfactual 
constructed by the real GDP per capita of the weighted average of countries that resemble SA’s 
historic performance. It uses data that predates the period of 1985–1994. A list of countries 
with similar characteristics to SA was selected to construct the synthetic SA, referred to as the 
donor pool. This approach assumes that if the GDP per capita before the imposition of sanctions 
and the synthetic are identical, it means that the markets would be identical if it were not for 
the influence of sanctions (Pchelintsev, 2019). 
The equation that will be used for the quantitative analysis is: 
• Change in annual GDP per capita (Economic cost in post-treatment period) = GDP per 
capita with sanctions (actual SA) – GDP per capita without sanctions (synthetic SA).  
• The economic cost is measured through the decrease in GDP per capita because of the 
imposition of economic sanctions. 
• The decrease in GDP per capita is measured as the difference with GDP per capita over 
the same period with and without sanctions, assuming all else equal. 
3.5 Predictors Selection and Data 
3.5.1 Period of analysis 
The period of analysis is 1961–2000. The longer the pre-event period, the more likely the 
synthetic control will be accurate (Campos, Coricelli, & Luigi, 2019). The data are sourced 
from the World Development Indicators and the earliest data available starts in 1961. The most 
comprehensive study on sanctions that studied 174 cases by Hufbauer et al. (2007) provides 
one state/local level case information until 2000 (Hufbauer, Elliot, & Oegg, 2007). This study 




history of economic sanctions. The end period for the analysis, therefore, is 2000 because the 
information from the Hufbauer et al. (2007) ends in 2000. 
3.5.2 Treatment period 
The treatment period is 1985–1994. Starting in 1985, major economic sanctions were instituted 
by multilateral institutions and important trade partners to SA. The UN had a voluntary ban on 
new investments, trade, and other economic activities. These sanctions can be defined as severe 
based on the definitions in Table 2. In August 1985, SA’s major lenders refused to refinance 
the short-term debt, leading to the rand depreciating by half. These actions are considered the 
start of the comprehensive economic sanctions on SA by multinational institutions (Manby, 
1992). Other multinational institutions and strategic trade partners also imposed 
comprehensive economic sanctions on SA during this period. The key differentiator between 
these sanctions between earlier periods is that they were economic, comprehensive, and 
imposed by multilateral institutions and strategic unilateral parties. Previous cases are mild or 
moderate because they did not include economic sanctions by strategic trade partners such as 
the US. More importantly, earlier sanctions were selective and limited, while the sanctions 
during this period were comprehensive (financial and trade), affecting the SA economy more 
broadly. 
Table 3.1: Definition of Sanctions Categories 
# 
Level  UN sanction 
1 Mild Restrictions on arms and other military hardware; typically include 
travel restrictions on a nation’s leadership or other diplomatic 
sanctions as well 
2 Moderate Moderate sanctions such as fuel embargoes, restrictions on trade in 
primary commodities, or the freezing of public and or private assets 
3 Severe Comprehensive economic sanctions such as embargoes on all or most 
economic activity between UN member states and the target 
Notes: This table indicates the definitions by Woods (2008) to differentiate between levels of sanctions. The 




The multilateral sanctions instituted by the UN ended in 1994, which is considered the end of 
the sanctions period because other sanctions ended earlier. 
3.5.3 Predictors and outcome variable 
The choice of predictors of the outcome should include variables that could estimate the path 
of the country affected by the intervention but should not include variables that anticipate the 
effects of the intervention. The countries used to estimate the synthetic control should not be 
affected by the event. 
The outcome variable is based on the specification by Abadie et al. (2003). The outcome 
variable in this study is the GDP per capita. The predictors selected for this study build on the 
work done by Billmeier and Nannicini (2013) in estimating the impact of liberalising 
economies. They leveraged literature on cross-country growth regressions to construct the 
predictors. These were supplemented by the predictors used by Chelwa et al. (2015), 
Pchelintsev (2016), and Gharehozli (2017). Predictors without complete information for at 
least one year in the pre-treatment period were dropped; therefore, despite being used in other 
studies, democracy, education, inflation, and unemployment were not used. The historic 
outcome variables are used as predictors because they help to provide a better pre-treatment fit 
between synthetic SA and actual SA. Historic outcome variables are also used by Chelwa et 
al. (2017) in their study of cigarette consumption in SA. The predictors used in this analysis 
are the following: GDP per capita (1961), GDP per capita (1972), GDP per capita (1983), GDP 
Growth (%), population growth (%), trade (% GDP), FDI (% of GDP), and Current Account 
Balance (% of GDP). 
3.5.4 Selection of donor pool 
The selection pool was constructed by leveraging a donor pool from a SCM paper (Chelwa et 
al., 2017) used for South Africa. Regional countries that were not included in this list and 
countries with similar natural endowments were added. Any countries that did not have 
complete data or countries that had had sanctions during the period were removed. 
This research paper relies on the selection of the donor pool used in the paper by Chelwa et al. 
(2015). It excludes countries from the donor pool that were classified as high-income countries 




with the South African Development Cooperation (SADC) countries. Gharehgozli (2017) used 
a donor pool that included regional countries, e.g., members of international bodies (e.g., 
OPEC) and neighbours with close economic similarities. Applying the same rationale as 
Gharehgozli (2017) and Pchelintsev (2016), this paper included other resource-dependent and 
emerging economies. Last, countries that had economic sanctions imposed during the period 
and or do not have a complete set of data for the post-treatment period are dropped (Chelwa et 
al., 2015). Hufbauer et al.’s (1990) work on economic sanctions was used to identify countries 
that suffered economic sanctions during the period. It is recommended to eliminate any country 
that might have suffered large idiosyncratic shocks during the study period. To avoid 
interpolation bias, the country pool should be restricted to similar countries.  
The selection of the donor pool is complicated by the fact that although having sanctions 
imposed on a country is not binary, there is a continuum on the type of sanctions and the degree 
to which they were implemented. Campos et al. (2019) faced a similar challenge in analysing 
the impact of integration on economic growth in Europe; the continuum of membership and 
extent of integration differed across different areas. For simplicity, this study relied on the 
research by Hufbauer et al. (1990) to identify countries that had economic sanctions. 
The empirical analysis is based on annual country-level panel data for the period 1961–2000. 
The control pool of countries includes 16 countries that have not had economic sanctions 
imposed on them, namely Argentina, Botswana, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, 












CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
4.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapter discussed the research methodology employed in this study. This 
penultimate chapter focuses on a discussion of the findings of the study. 
Table 4.1 provides a list of the donor countries and share of each in the construction of the 
synthetic SA. SA’s counterfactual is best reproduced by a weighted average of Argentina 
(65.6%), Mexico (10.7%), and Peru (23.7%), two of which are Latin American countries. 
These three countries with their respective weights produce the lowest pre-treatment RMSE 
(Chelwa et al., 2017). The weight of the other countries in the pool is zero. The pre-treatment 
RMSE between the actual SA and its counterpart is 227 (3.7% of average GDP per capita), that 
means that on average, the pre-treatment difference between SA and synthetic SA is less than 
5%. 
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Table 4.2 compares the average pre-treatment characteristics for SA with its counterpart using 
the weights in Table 4.1. The table shows that synthetic SA resembles actual SA in most of the 
pre-treatment characteristics. The most significant differences are FDI and Trade as a 
percentage of GDP; the actual SA is over 13% and 32% higher, respectively than the synthetic 
SA. According to Chelwa et al. (2017), this implies that there is no linear combination of 
countries in the donor pool that can perfectly reproduce SA’s Trade. Furthermore, it is not 
atypical to have predictors that differ in magnitude between the treated country and its synthetic 
counterpart because the treated county could have some extreme predictors (Chelwa et al., 
2015). 
Table 4.2: Characteristics of Treated and Synthetic SA 
Characteristic Treated Synthetic 
GDP per capita (1961) 4685,49 4822,96 
GDP per capita (1972) 6274,51 6272,47 
GDP per capita (1973) 6380,61 6456,67 
GDP growth 4,14% 3,37% 
Population growth 2,59% 1,96% 
Current Account Balance −1,47% −2,06% 
Foreign Direct Investment  26,76% 39,27% 
Trade 51,27% 19,50% 
Notes: Average pre-treatment characteristics for SA and Synthetic SA. Obtained by applying the weights in Table 
4.2 to the pre-treatment characteristics of the donor pool. GDP per capita is in constant 2010 US$. 
Table 4.2 and the pre-treatment RMSE proves that synthetic SA largely matches SA regarding 
pre-treatment characteristics. Hence, synthetic SA can be used to estimate the treatment effect 
of the policy change. Figure 4.1 plots the GDP per capita (in constant 2010 USD) for SA and 
synthetic SA over the period 1961–2000. The vertical distance between SA and synthetic SA 
is the treatment effect (Chelwa et al., 2017). Figure 1 indicates that the synthetic SA closely 
tracks the GDP per capita of SA (treated unit) before the sanctions period. After the post-
treatment period of 1985, the effect of sanctions leads to a decreasing trend in the outcome 
variable for the treated unit, but this decreasing trend starts in the early 1980s. Starting in 1991, 
the impact of economic sanctions on the SA economy is more pronounced. The gap between 
the treated unit and the synthetic control continues to widen until 1998. This could indicate that 
there is a substantial lag effect of the impact of sanctions on the economy. The effect of 




comparing them to the pre-treatment characteristics (Chelwa et al., 2015). For example, the 
difference in GDP per capita between actual SA and synthetic SA is 30% in 1998. 
The impact of sanctions indicated by Figure 4.1 is consistent with Coulibaly (2009) that found 
a decrease in economic performance rates during the sanctions period compared to the levels 
that would have stayed the same if the variable kept the pre-embargo average growth rates 
(Coulibaly, 2009). The long-term impact of sanctions on SA could support Hotton’s (2016) 
finding that sanctions could lead to long-term damage to the productive capacity of the target 
country. 
Figure 4.1: Synthetic versus SA GDP per Capita 
  
Notes: Comparison of SA and Synthetic SA GDP per capita if sanctions started in 1980 instead of 1985. 
Figure 4.2 indicates the treatment effect by measuring the GDP per capita difference between 
SA and its synthetic counterpart. Table 4.3 shows the actual estimates of the treatment effect. 
During the treatment period, the GDP per capita for actual SA was less than or equal to 
synthetic SA for six of the years, indicating a negative treatment effect. Starting in 1991, 




in 1998. In 1998, synthetic SA had a GDP per capita of 30%. After 1998, it started to reduce 
each year. These results support both hypotheses listed in 1.3. 
Figure 4.2: Synthetic versus SA Gap (Synthetic Treatment Effect) 
  
Notes: The figure shows a gap in GDP per capita between SA and its synthetic counterpart over the period 1961-
2000. The treatment effect is closer to zero before the treatment effect. After the treatment effect, synthetic SA has 
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1986 6130,94 6359,63 −228,70 −4% 
1987 6113,40 6469,58 −356,18 −6% 
1988 6224,41 6237,97 −13,56 0% 
1989 6226,39 5745,07 481,32 8% 
1990 6059,80 5558,90 500,90 8% 
1991 5852,04 5891,15 −39,10 −1% 
1992 5585,76 6176,04 −590,28 −11% 
1993 5517,53 6516,82 −999,29 −18% 
1994 5563,50 6834,96 −1271,46 −23% 
1995 5615,30 6591,43 −976,13 −17% 
1996 5745,11 6855,00 −1109,89 −19% 
1997 5792,13 7293,85 −1501,72 −26% 
1998 5728,50 7460,26 −1731,76 −30% 
1999 5779,16 7214,62 −1435,46 −25% 
2000 5937,63 7153,68 −1216,06 −20% 
Notes: The table shows the results for the GDP per capita for actual SA, synthetic SA, the gap and a percentage 
of the gap for the period after the treatment effect 1985–2000. 
4.2 Evaluation of Countries with Positive Weights in Table 4.1 
Given Argentina’s significant weight (65.6%) in synthetic SA, it is important to evaluate how 
the economy performed over the period. Argentina grew at an average of 3.2% between 1990 
and 2000 while treated SA only grew by 1.7% (Artana, 2010). Argentina’s growth is accredited 
to the move towards privatisation, free trade, and unrestricted capital flows (Glaeser, Tella, & 
Llach, 2018). By 1998, Argentina’s growth came to a halt because of the economic depression 
(1998–2002) (Coremberg, 2014). This could explain why the gap narrows between synthetic 
SA and treated SA. Mexico has a weight of 10.7% in synthetic SA. Mexico’s growth in the 
1990s is accredited to improved openness and trade relations. After signing the NAFTA 
Agreement, growth restarted in 1995 at a GDP growth rate of 3.7% (Kehoe & Meza, 2011). 
Overall, the economic performance in Mexico improved with inflation falling to single digits. 
Peru grew at an average GDP growth rate of 3.16% during the 1990s after a period of reform. 




since 1990 (Jenkner, 2006). All three countries that make up synthetic SA experienced 
exceptional GDP growth rates during the 1990s, explaining why the GDP per capita of 
synthetic SA increases in Figure 4.1. This growth in the GDP per capita for the three countries 
should be influenced by the same factors (e.g., predictor variable) as the outcome variable for 
SA to meet the convex hull requirements. The convex hull requirement is one of the three 
conditions that must be met to get a close approximation for the treated country. The other 
conditions are discussed in Section 3.2. 
4.3 What Explains the Lag Effect? 
The question of the lag effect is not fully addressed in the literature. Van Bergeijk and Van 
Marrewijk (1995) evaluated if sanctions need time to work and found sanctions do not work 
immediately but they negatively impact the economy in the long-term if the damage caused 
exceeds the country’s ability to adjust. The US General Accounting Office (1992) found that 
although the effects of trade sanctions dissipate over time, most of the additional costs remain 
until the sanctions are lifted. The United States General Accounting Office (1992) found that 
the indirect costs of sanctions are slow long-term growth and sanctions-related inefficiencies 
in the target nation’s economy. The direct costs related to limited new investment at higher 
costs (interest rates) caused investment to decline, leading to lower rates of long-term economic 
growth (United States General Accounting Office, 1992). Levy (1999) argues that while there 
was a lag between the imposition of sanctions and change of the regime in SA, it is unlikely 
that the impact would have been immediate. These arguments support why in Table 4.3 the 
treatment effect starts in 1991 and continued for the entire period under evaluation. The 
treatment effect, however, could be explained by a flat GDP per capita in SA due to the 
uncertainty because of the transition. 
Despite the uncertainty, there was a flow of more foreign capital in the country. Interestingly, 
Coulibaly (2009) found that with the removal of economic sanctions and the reintegration of 
SA into the global economy, foreign investment started to flow into the country. For example, 
the World Bank accounted for $1 billion worth of developments for SA in 1993 (Coulibaly, 
2009). Wesso (2003) also found that investment by foreigners increased. There, however, was 
volatility in the net direct investment after SA companies received exchange control approval 
to invest offshore. So, the limited growth could be that SA companies invested outside the 




4.4 Placebo Tests 
The treatment effects could have been produced by random chance, in which case they would 
not be statistically significantly (Chelwa et al., 2015). To address this issue, the inferential 
techniques suggested by Abadie et al. (2010) are applied by placebo tests. An estimated effect 
for SA is not considered significant if it is not large enough relative to the placebo estimates 
(Barseghyan, 2019). 
SA is placed in the donor pool and each country of the countries in Table 4.1 is subjected to 
the same synthetic control approach applied to SA. This results in a “vect” can be compared. 
SA’s treatment effects would be statistically significant if the probability of obtaining a 
treatment effect as large as SA’s, in the distribution effects, were small” (Chelwa et al., 2015, 
p. 121). 
Figure 4.3 shows the treatment effect for donor countries. The share indicates that SA has the 
largest negative treatment effect and one of the better fits. Two countries have a better fit than 
SA, namely Ecuador and the Philippines. Ecuador and the Philippines have a higher probability 
of having a placebo effect due to the better fit (Gharehgozli, 2017). The Philippines has a 
treatment effect larger than SA in percentage terms. The probability of any country achieving 
a treatment effect that is as large as SA is [1/16 = 6.25%], which is a small significance level 




Figure 4.3: Placebo Effect 
 
Barseghyan (2019) recommend that if the estimated placebo effect is large due to a poor fit in 
the pre-intervention period, the distribution of ratios of post-to-pre-sanctions RMSPEs are 
further evaluated. This analysis was not conducted because the estimated placebo effect is not 
large. A 10% level is recommended as a stringent threshold for inferring under the SCM given 
that donor pools usually contain a small number of countries (Chelwa et al., 2015). These 
results, therefore, are statistically significant at the 10% threshold (Cavallo et al., 2010). 
4.5 Robustness 
This section evaluates the robustness of the treatment effects. First, the treatment effects are 
evaluated to determine if they are sensitive to the composition of the donor pool. This is done 
by excluding the countries with positive donor weights and running a new iteration of 
estimating the treatment effect. The purpose of this exercise is to ensure that the estimated 
effects are not driven by single donor countries with a positive weight (Chelwa et al., 2015). 





Figures 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 show the results of excluding the donor countries with positive 
weights. All three charts show a similar trend to chart 1 but with Argentina having a poorer 
pre-treatment fit. The chart with Argentina excluded from the donor pool has a poorer pre-
treatment fit but the shape of the chart is similar post-treatment. 
Table 4.4 compares the actual treatment effect results with the results from each positive 
country left out. The treatment effects are illustrated as the annual percentage deviation from 
the respective counterfactual trend line. Column (2) shows the previous results while columns 
(3), (4), and (5) show the results from excluding donor countries with positive weights from 
the donor pool. The treatment effect across all columns reaches 29% or more by 1998, which 
is consistent with the 30% found in the main results. The RMSE without Argentina in the pool 
is 3.5 times poorer than the main results. 
Although the pre-treatment results are poorer when Argentina is removed from the donor pool, 
the treatment effect results showed that the results are not dependent on the composition of the 
donor pool. The results below indicate that the treatment effects estimates are independent of 





Figure 4.4: SA versus Synthetic SA (GDP per capita) – Excluding Mexico 
 
Figure 4.5: SA versus Synthetic SA (GDP per capita) – Excluding Peru 
 














Mexico Excluding Peru 
1986 −4% −14% −2% −4% 
1987 −6% −15% −4% −5% 
1988 0% −11% 2% −1% 
1989 8% −12% 11% 6% 
1990 8% −19% 12% 6% 
1991 −1% −26% 3% −4% 
1992 −11% −34% −8% −15% 
1993 −18% −36% −16% −22% 
1994 −23% −39% −21% −26% 
1995 −17% −28% −16% −20% 
1996 −19% −31% −18% −22% 
1997 −26% −37% −24% −29% 
1998 −30% −43% −29% −34% 
1999 −25% −43% −23% −28% 
2000 −20% −44% −18% −23% 
RMSE 227 818 238 258 
The final robustness check is related to the start of the treatment, so the economic sanctions 
only started in 1980 (5 years before the sanctions started). Figure 4.5 shows that the 
counterfactual trend line is similar in Figure 4.4, but also gives the impression that the 
economic decline in both actual and synthetic SA started in the early 1980s. This trend, 
however, is not due to sanctions because it affects both the synthetic and actual SA. The global 
economy suffered from the oil crisis. More importantly, these results support the view of the 












CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Conclusion and Recommendations 
This study aimed to evaluate the economic cost of sanctions that were imposed on SA in the 
mid-1980s. The economic sanctions imposed on SA between 1985 and 1995 by the UN, US, 
EC, Nordic Council and other important trade partners led to an economic cost of 
approximately 30% by 1998. This negative impact on the economy, measured by the GDP per 
capita, continued until 1998.  
The hypotheses of the study are the following: 
• H1: Economic sanctions had a large negative impact on SA’s GDP per capita between 
1985 and 1994 
• H2: Economic sanctions on SA continued to have a negative impact after they had ended 
The literature review on economic sanctions focuses on evaluating if sanctions were effective 
and explains the level of their effectiveness. The effects of economic sanctions on the economy 
are evident in the reduction of benefits associated with trade and in the withdrawal of foreign 
sources of capital. Production inefficiency is caused by the increasing cost of capital and the 
lack of the availability of important inputs. Neunkirch and Neumeier (2014) found that UN 
sanctions led to a decrease of 2.3-3.5% in the target state’s real GDP per capita growth. 
 SA has been a case study for evaluating sanctions due to the long history of sanctions against 
the apartheid government. A significant gap in the analysis is that none of the existing studies 
that were conducted estimate the economic cost of sanctions by comparing the growth path 
(GDP per capita) after the imposition of sanctions versus had sanctions not been imposed on 
SA. The few studies that do evaluate the economic cost sanctions only evaluate the cost of 
sanctions during the time that they were implemented instead of considering the longer-term 
effects. 
SA has a long history of non-economic sanctions. The key differentiator between these 
sanctions between earlier periods and those that started in 1985 is that they were economic, 
comprehensive, imposed by multilateral institutions, and strategic unilateral parties. These 
sanctions were severe while earlier episodes were either mild or moderate. Previous cases were 




few cases of economic sanctions were selective and limited, while the sanctions during 1985–
1994 were multilateral and compressive (financial and trade) affecting the SA economy more 
broadly. In the mid-1980s, major strategic trading partners (EC, UN, and US) imposed 
comprehensive and economic sanctions against SA. The US sanctions lasted until 1991, while 
the UN sanctions ended in 1994. 
Using the SCM, the economic cost of sanctions is measured by estimating the difference 
between the treated country (SA) and the counterpart (synthetic SA). Synthetic SA reflects 
actual SA in the pre-treatment period, indicating that it is a good counterfactual. The results 
indicate that the economic cost is most pronounced between 1991 and 1998. This signals that 
the economic sanctions continued to have a lag effect even after they were concluded. The gap 
between synthetic SA and actual SA in the GDP per capita (treatment effect) reaches 30% in 
1998. Thus, results support both hypotheses presented in section 1.3 because they indicate a 
large negative impact on South Africa’s GDP during the sanctions period. Sanctions continued 
to have a negative effect after they had ended. 
The results could be attributed to the treatment effect (sanctions) on the treated country (actual 
SA). SA has the largest negative treatment effect and the line better fits when compared against 
treatment effects of other comparable. The placebo test reveals that the results are statistically 
significant at the 10% threshold. 
The findings are also robust to the composition of the donor pool and the start of the sanctions. 
There is a clear treatment effect when the countries with positive weights are removed from 
the donor pool one at a time, although the pre-treatment fit is poorer when Argentina is removed 
from the composition pool. Even when the treatment event was moved to 1980, the results are 
similar. Furthermore, the results are not sensitive to the composition of the donor pool or to the 
start of the sanctions. 
5.2 Implications for policymakers 
These results have implications for both the target nation and the sender. For the sender, the results 
illustrate that sanctions have an economic cost that lasts for a long period. The results also appeal to 
those who hold that sanctions that impose an economic cost are more likely to lead to a desired outcome 




target nation, the results mean that policymakers should acknowledge that any policy that leads to 
sanctions may lead to a severe and long-lasting impact on the economy.  
5.3 Limitations of the Study 
A limitation of this study is that it does not evaluate the role that sanctions played in South 
Africa’s transition to democracy. Potential areas for future investigation include estimating the 
humanitarian impact of the sanctions imposed on South Africa by applying the SCM approach 
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